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Abstract
Evidence accumulation models of simple decision-making have long assumed
that the brain estimates a scalar decision variable corresponding to the log-
likelihood ratio of the two alternatives. Typical neural implementations of
this algorithmic cognitive model assume that large numbers of neurons are
each noisy exemplars of the scalar decision variable. Here we propose a neu-
ral implementation of the diffusion model in which many neurons construct
and maintain the Laplace transform of the distance to each of the decision
bounds. As in classic findings from brain regions including LIP, the firing
rate of neurons coding for the Laplace transform of net accumulated evi-
dence grows to a bound during random dot motion tasks. However, rather
than noisy exemplars of a single mean value, this approach makes the novel
prediction that firing rates grow to the bound exponentially; across neurons
there should be a distribution of different rates. A second set of neurons
records an approximate inversion of the Laplace transform; these neurons
directly estimate net accumulated evidence. In analogy to time cells and
place cells observed in the hippocampus and other brain regions, the neu-
rons in this second set have receptive fields along a “decision axis.” This
finding is consistent with recent findings from rodent recordings. This the-
oretical approach places simple evidence accumulation models in the same
mathematical language as recent proposals for representing time and space
in cognitive models for memory.
The computational models of cognition that are most influential on neuroscience were
developed in mathematical psychology to account for behavior without regard to neural con-
straints. For instance, the Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) model of working memory main-
tenance was developed to account for behavioral findings from continuous paired associate
learning and other behavioral memory tasks. The central idea of the Atkinson and Shiffrin
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(1968) model—that working memory holds a small number of recently-experienced stimuli
in an activated state—went on to be extremely influential on neurophysiological studies of
working memory maintenance (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Fuster & Jervey, 1982) as well
as computational neuroscience models of working memory (e.g., Goldman, 2009; Lisman &
Idiart, 1995; Compte, Brunel, Goldman-Rakic, & Wang, 2000). Similarly, models for rein-
forcement learning originally developed to account for behavior (Sutton & Barto, 1981) have
been extremely influential in understanding the neural basis of reward systems in the brain
(Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). Mathematical
models of evidence accumulation (Laming, 1968; Link, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978) have organized
and informed a large body of neurobiological work (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). There are many
neurophysiological phenomena in each domain that do not follow naturally from the neural
predictions of these models—this is not surprising insofar as they were developed in most
cases long before any relevant neurophysiological data was available. Moreover, the models
from each domain seem very different from one another despite the fact that any real-world
behavior undoubtedly depends on interactions among essentially the entire brain.
Part of the mismatch perhaps follows from taking models developed at an algorith-
mic level literally at an implementational or biological level. In this paper, we extend a
formalism that has already been applied to behavioral and neural data from working mem-
ory experiments (Howard, Shankar, Aue, & Criss, 2015; Tiganj, Cromer, Roy, Miller, &
Howard, 2018) and neural representations of space and time (Howard et al., 2014) and
show that it applies also to models of evidence accumulation. This formalism estimates
functions of variables out in the world by constructing the Laplace transform of those func-
tions and then inverting the transform (Shankar & Howard, 2012, 2013; Howard et al.,
2014). We show that this approach leads to a neural implementation of the diffusion model
(Ratcliff, 1978). This neural implementation of the diffusion model provides an account of
neural data that makes a number of novel quantitative predictions.
The diffusion model and sequential sampling
Models of response times have been a major focus of work in cognitive and math-
ematical psychology for many decades (Luce, 1986). Evidence accumulation models have
received special attention (Laming, 1968; Link, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978). These models hypoth-
esize that during the time between the arrival of a probe and the execution of a behavioral
decision, the brain contains an internal variable the dynamics of which describe progress
towards the decision. For our purposes it will be sufficient to describe the dynamics of
accumulated evidence with the following random walk:
Xt+∆ = Xt + ∆Et (1)
where Et is the instantaneous evidence available at time t. Equation 1 describes a perfect
integrator. In simple evidence accumulation tasks, Et is not known in detail. Under these
circumstances, one typically takes Et to be a stochastic term.
The diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) is the most widely-used of the evidence accumu-
lation models. In the diffusion model, one assumes Et is a normally distributed random
variable with a non-zero mean referred to as the drift rate. The units of Xt are usually
chosen to be the standard deviation of the normal distribution. The response is emitted
when Xt reaches either of two boundaries; the value at the lower and upper boundaries
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are referred to as 0 and a respectively. In the diffusion model, the starting point of the
dynamics are referred to with a parameter z.
The diffusion model can be understood as an implementation of a sequential ratio
test, a normative solution to the problem of forming a decision between two alternatives
(Wald, 1945, 1947; Wald & Wolfowitz, 1948). Suppose we have two alternatives, l and
r that could have generated a sequence of independent observations of data, di. Starting
with a prior belief about the likelihood ratio of the two alternatives P0(L)P0(R) , we find that the
likelihood ratio of the two hypotheses after observing t data points is
P (L|d1 . . . dt)
P (R|d1 . . . dt) =
t∏
i=1
[
P (di|L)
P (di|R)
]
P0(L)
P0(R)
(2)
The likelihood ratio on the lhs tells us the degree of certainty we have that the sequence of
data was generated by alternative l; the inverse of the likelihood ratio tells us the degree
of certainty we have that the data was generated by alternative r. We can determine the
level of certainty we require to terminate sampling and execute a decision.
The logarithm of the likelihood ratio is closely related to the diffusion model. Taking
the log of both sides of Eq. 2 we find
logP (L|d1 . . . dt)−logP (R|d1 . . . dt) = logP0(L)−logP0(R)+
t∑
i=1
[logP (di|L)− logP (di|R)]
(3)
Here the prior log likelihood ratio appears as the starting point of a sum; each additional ob-
servation contributes an additive change in the evidence for one alternative over the other.
Reaching a criterion can be understood as the log likelihood ratio reaching a particular
threshold (recall that log x = − log(1/x)).1 In this way the diffusion model can be under-
stood as an implementation of a sequential ratio test; the parameters of the diffusion model
can be mapped onto interpretable quantities. The boundary separation a can be understood
as proportional to the log likelihood ratio necessary to make a decision; the starting point
z can be understood as a prior probability2 and the drift rate can be understood as the
expectation of the log likelihood ratio contributed by each additional sample.3
There are many variants on this basic strategy for evidence accumulation in simple
perception tasks that have been explored in the mathematical psychology literature (e.g.,
Usher & McClelland, 2001; Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Brown &
Heathcote, 2008). They have various advantages and disadvantages but all retain the feature
of dynamics of a decision variable gradually growing towards a boundary of some type.
The diffusion model and other models of this class have been used to measure behavioral
performance in an extremely wide range of behavioral tasks in humans (e.g., Ratcliff &
McKoon, 2008).
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Figure 1. Neural evidence for evidence accumulation. a. In some brain regions, neurons
accumulate evidence towards a bound. These studies typically use random dot motion. The plot
shows average firing rate across a number of LIP neurons. When the decision was made in the
cells’ preferred direction (solid lines) the firing rate grew as evidence accumulated, with more rapid
accumulation for greater degrees of coherence. When the response was in the other direction, firing
rate decreased. When aligned on the response (right), the neurons’ firing rate was tightly coupled
at the time of response, as if the response was triggered when the firing of the population reached
a threshold. After Gold & Shadlen (2007). b. In other brain regions (e.g., PPC), the firing rate
depends on position along a decision path. In this experiment, the animal ran down a corridor in
virtual reality. Visual stimuli were presented on the left or the right; at the end of the corridor, the
animal was rewarded for turning in the direction that had more stimuli. Each row represents the
firing rate of a neuron as a function of position along the track. The left panels show trials on which
all of the stimuli were on the left; the right panels show trials on which all of the stimuli were on
the right. The top panels show cells that were selective for left turn trials; the bottom panels show
cells that were selective for right turn trials. After Morcos & Harvey (2016).
Neural evidence for evidence accumulation models
There are two broad classes of evidence from the neurobiology of evidence accumula-
tion that we will review here. First, there is evidence dating from the late 1990’s for neurons
whose firing rate appears to integrate information to a bound. These studies are typically
done in monkeys in the random-dot-motion paradigm. Second, a more recent body of work
shows evidence for neurons that activate heterogeneously and sequentially during infor-
mation integration. These studies typically use rodents in experimental paradigms where
the evidence to be accumulated is under more precise temporal control. These literatures
differ not only in species, recording techniques and behavioral task, but also in the brain
1Zhang and Maloney (2012) provide an outstanding discussion of the centrality of log likelihood to
understanding cognitive psychology.
2When z = a/2 the prior is uninformative.
3In many experiments, such as the random dot motion task discussed extensively below, it may be difficult
to make a connection to the normative sequential sampling model.
EVIDENCE ACCUMULATION IN THE LAPLACE DOMAIN 5
regions that are investigated. The theoretical framework we will present provides a possible
link between these domains, with neurons that integrate to a bound corresponding to the
Laplace transform of the function describing distance to the decision bound and neurons
that activate sequentially corresponding to the inverse transform of this function.
Neurons that integrate to a bound. Models of evidence accumulation have been used
to understand the neurobiology of simple perceptual judgments. In a pioneering study,
Hanes and Schall (1996) found that the firing rate of neurons in the frontal eye fields (FEF)
predicted the time of a movement in a voluntary movement initiation experiment. During
the preparatory period, the firing rate grew. When the firing rate reached a particular value,
the movement was initiated and could not be terminated via an instruction to terminate the
movement. In subsequent studies, neurons in the lateral interparietal area (LIP) appeared
to comport with the characteristic predictions of evidence accumulation models in a simple
decision-making task.
In the random-dot-motion (RDM) paradigm, a display consisting of moving dots ap-
pears in the visual field. Some proportion of dots move in the same direction; a movement
(typically a saccade) in the direction of the coherent movement is rewarded. The decision
made by monkeys is predicted above chance by the particular sequence of random dots
even though there is on average no coherent movement (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008).
Neurons in the middle temporal area (MT) fire in response to these moving stimuli and
predict perceptual discriminability in the task (Newsome, Britten, & Movshon, 1989; Brit-
ten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992). During performance of the random dot motion
task, the firing rate of LIP neurons with fields in the movement direction grows during the
decision-making period (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). Conversely, neurons with receptive
fields in the other direction show a decrease in firing rate. Similar results have been found
in a number of brain regions (see Brody & Hanks, 2016, for a review) and LIP is not re-
quired for decisions (Katz, Yates, Pillow, & Huk, 2016). For neurons with receptive fields
corresponding to the correct direction, firing rate grows faster when the motion coherence is
greater and their firing rate is approximately constant around the time at which a response
is made (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002, see also (Cook & Maunsell, 2002) for similar results in
ventral intraparietal cortex, VIP). Figure 1a summarizes many of these findings (Gold &
Shadlen, 2007).
A number of computational neuroscientists and cognitive modelers have understood
the neurons as indexing a decision-variable that changes as additional evidence is accumu-
lated (e.g., Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Wang, 2008; Beck et al., 2008). The standard assumption
in these approaches has been that a large population of neurons each provides a noisy esti-
mate of the instantaneous evidence. Each neuron signals the decision variable via its firing
rate; by averaging over many neurons one can compute a better estimate of the magnitude
of the decision variable (e.g., Zandbelt, Purcell, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2014).
Sequential neural responses during evidence accumulation. However, recent evidence
suggests that rather than many neurons being noisy exemplars of a single scalar strength,
there is in many brain regions heterogeneity in the response of units in simple decision-
making tasks (Scott et al., 2017; Morcos & Harvey, 2016; Hanks et al., 2015; Meister,
Hennig, & Huk, 2013). In these studies, rather than the RDM paradigm, the task allows
more precise control over the time at which evidence becomes available, enabling a detailed
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investigation of the effect of information at different times on behavior (Brunton, Botvinick,
& Brody, 2013) and also neural responses. For instance, one might present a series of clicks
on one side of an animal’s head or the other and reward a response to the side that had
more clicks (Brunton et al., 2013; Hanks et al., 2015). Other variants of this approach can
utilize flashes of light (Scott et al., 2017) or visual stimuli presented along the left or right
side of a corridor in virtual reality (Morcos & Harvey, 2016).
The critical result from these studies is that rather than changing firing rate monoton-
ically with the decision variable as evidence is accumulated, in several experiments neurons
instead respond in a sequence as the decision variable changes. The experiment of Morcos
and Harvey (2016) provides a very clear result. In this experiment, mice ran along a vir-
tual corridor. During the run, a series of distinctive visual stimuli were presented along
the left or the right side of the virtual corridor. At the end of the corridor, the mice were
rewarded for turning in the direction that had more visual stimuli. Morcos and Harvey
(2016) observed that neurons in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) were activated as if
they had receptive fields along a decision axis. Figure 1b illustrates the key findings of
Morcos and Harvey (2016). On trials where all of the evidence was in one direction or the
other, the population fired sequentially, with distinct sequences for progress towards the
different decisions. Notably, the neurons in Figure 1b seem to show an overrepresentation
of points near the decision bound. This can be seen from the “hook” in Figure 1b.
The Laplace transform in cognitive science and computational neuroscience
In this paper we pursue the hypothesis that the two classes of neural data from
evidence accumulation experiments can be understood as the Laplace transform and inverse
transform of a function describing the net evidence since the decision-making period began.
This places models of evidence accumulation in the same theoretical framework as recent
models of memory that utilize the Laplace transform and its inverse (Shankar & Howard,
2012, 2013) to construct cognitive models of a range of memory tasks (Howard et al., 2015).
The Laplace transform can also be used to construct neural models of time cells and place
cells (Howard et al., 2014).
The cooperative behavior of many neurons can be understood as representing func-
tions over variables in the world. For instance, individual photoreceptors respond to light
in a small region of the retina. The activity of a set of many photoreceptors can be un-
derstood as representing the pattern of light as a function of location on the retina. For
some variables, such as the location of light on the retina or the frequency of a sound,
the problem of how to represent functions amounts to the problem of placing receptors
in the correct location along a spatial gradient (e.g., hair cells at different positions along
the cochlea are stimulated by different frequencies). For other variables, such as time and
allocentric position, we cannot simply place receptors to directly detect the function of in-
terest. For instance, “time cells” observed in a range of brain regions appear to code for the
time since a relevant stimulus was experienced (MacDonald, Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum,
2011; Mello, Soares, & Paton, 2015; Bolkan et al., 2017; Tiganj et al., 2018). The stimulus
that is being represented is in the past (in some experiments as much as one minute in the
past). Similarly, (at least in some circumstances) place cells in the hippocampus represent
distance from an environmental landmark (Gothard, Skaggs, Moore, & McNaughton, 1996).
These cells show the same form of activity in the dark (Gothard, Hoffman, Battaglia, &
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McNaughton, 2001) and cannot reflect locally available cues. How can the brain construct
functions of time and space? One solution is that the brain does not directly estimate the
function of interest. Rather the brain maintains the Laplace transform of the function of
interest and then inverts the transform to estimate the function directly.
The Laplace transform contains all the information about the transformed function.
The mathematics of the Laplace transform are well-understood. Given a function f(t), the
Laplace transform of f(t) is written as F (s):
F (s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−st
′
f(t′)dt′ (4)
That is, one starts with a function f(t) that specifies a numerical value at many different
values of t. By computing F (s) via Eq. 4 with many different values of s, we construct
the Laplace transform of f .4 Each value of s simply gives the sum of the product of f(t)
with an exponentially-decaying kernel that peaks at zero. The Laplace transform has been
studied for hundreds of years and is widely-used in engineering applications.
The most important property of the Laplace transform for present purposes is that
the transfrom can be inverted. Put simply, that means that if we know the values of
F (s) for each value of s, we can in principle recover the value of f(t) at every value of t.
The most widely-used algorithms for inverting the transform involve taking the limit of an
integral computed in the complex plane. These methods are complicated and difficult to
implement neurally. Fortuitously, there is an algorithm for inverting the Laplace transform
that only requires real coefficients and nothing more demanding than computing derivatives
(Post, 1930). This technique, referred to as the Post approximation, yields a scale-invariant
approximation of the inverse transform, and thus recovers the original function (Shankar &
Howard, 2012) and is neurally realistic (Shankar & Howard, 2012; Liu, Tiganj, Hasselmo,
& Howard, in press).
Formally, we can keep track of the Laplace transform with a differential equation:
dF (s)
dt
= −sF (s) + f (t) (5)
The solution to this equation at time t:
Ft (s) =
∫ t
−∞
e−s(t−t
′)f(t′)dt′ (6)
is just the Laplace transform of f(t′ < t). Note that updating Eq. 5 as time unfolds requires
only information about the input available at time t and the value of F (s) at the immediately
preceding moment. Because Eq. 5 implements the Laplace transform of f(t′ < t), we know
that a set of units Ft(s) contains all of the information present in the function f(t
′ < t).
Because the function is the input presented over the past, we can conclude that at time
t, F (s) maintains the Laplace transform of the past. If we could invert the transform, we
could recover the function of the past itself.
4For our purposes it is sufficient to consider real values of s.
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Figure 2. The Laplace transform for time and space. a. The Laplace transform of functions of
time. Consider an input f(t) that is non-zero for a brief period. After the input, the different neu-
rons corresponding to the Laplace transform, F (s) activate and then decay exponentially. Different
neurons have different values of s and thus decay at different rates. Neurons with these properties
have recently been observed in the lateral entorhinal cortex (Tsao, et al., 2018). Neurons repre-
senting the inverse transform f˜(
∗
τ) respond a characteristic time after the input. They fire when
the past stimulus enters their receptive fields, defined by their value of
∗
τ . b. Neural functions
of time. If the brain contained sets of neurons that represented functions of time, we would see
sequentially-activated neurons. Here we see simultaneously-recorded sequentially activated neurons
in the hippocampus recorded using calcium imaging. Each row gives the activation of one neuron as
a function of time during the delay. The neurons are sorted according to their peak time. Note the
curvature. This means that there are progressively fewer neurons coding for later in the delay. The
dashed red line gives an analytic curve under the assumption of logarithmic compression. Although
this recording technique does not allow one to measure the width of individual cells’ tuning, many
papers using extracellular electrophysiology have shown that time fields also grow wider as the se-
quence unfolds. After Mau, et al., (2018). c. Laplace transform for variables other than time. Left:
Schematic for the method for constructing the Laplace transform of variables x in the world. With
access to the time derivative of x, the method modifies the differential equation for maintaining the
Laplace tranform of time by α(t) = dxdt . If the input f is a function of x(t), then F (s) maintains
the Laplace transform of f(x). Right: Consider a case in which the animal encounters a spatial
landmark at x = 0 causing an input via f and then moves in the neighborhood of the landmark
(with x > 0). As the animal moves away, dx/dt > 0 and the cells in F (s) decay exponentially. But
if the animal turns around and heads back toward the startng point, dx/dt < 0 and the cells grow
exponentially. However, firing is always just a function of x. Under these circumstances, the Laplace
transform behaves like border cells with different space constants and neurons participating in the
inverse Laplace transform behave like place cells. After Howard, et al., (2014).
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The Post approximation provides a way to approximately invert the transform. This
method can be written as follows:
f˜
(∗
τ
)
≡ L-1k F (s) (7)
= Cks
k+1 d
k
dsk
F (s) (8)
where
∗
τ ≡ −k/s, k is an integer constant that controls the precision of the inverse, Ck is a
constant that depends on k and d
k
dsk
means to take the kth derivative with respect to s. Post
(1930) proved that in the limit as k →∞, the inverse is precise and f˜t(∗τ) = f(t+ ∗τ). The
variable
∗
τ is negative; for each unit in f˜ its value of
∗
τ characterizes the time in the past that
unit represents. When k is small, this method yields only an approximate estimate of the
function. The errors in the reconstruction appear as receptive fields in time with a width
that increases for time points further in the past. Figure 2a illustrates the time dynamics
of F (s) and f˜(
∗
τ) for a simple input. It is worth noting that the time dynamics of F (s)
and f˜(
∗
τ) resemble neurophysiological findings of so-called “temporal context cells” in the
lateral entorhinal cortex (Tsao et al., 2018) and “time cells” observed in the hippocampus
and other regions (Pastalkova, Itskov, Amarasingham, & Buzsaki, 2008; MacDonald et al.,
2011; Mau et al., 2018) respectively.
Generalization to hidden variables other than time. Equations 5 and 7 provide a
concise account for representing functions of time (Shankar & Howard, 2012) that mimics
the firing of time cells in a range of brain regions (Fig. 2b, see also Mau et al., 2018; Tiganj
et al., 2018) and can be readily implemented in realistic neural models (Tiganj, Hasselmo,
& Howard, 2015; Liu et al., in press). In this paper we exploit the fact that this coding
scheme can also be used to construct functions over variables other than time. Consider
the simple generalization of Eq. 5:
dF (s)
dt
= α(t) [−sF (s) + f (t)] (9)
Note that this reduces to Eq. 5 if α(t) = 1. If one can arrange for α(t) to be equal to the time
derivative of some variable x, α(t) = dxdt , then one can use Eq. 9 to construct the Laplace
transform of functions over x instead of over time (Howard et al., 2014).5 For instance, if
f(t) is non-zero only when an animal encounters the start box of a linear track, and if α(t)
is the animal’s velocity along the track, then as the animal runs back and forth along the
track, α(t) changes sign. During these periods of time, the firing rate of each unit in F (s)
decays as an exponentially-decreasing function of distance. At the same time, units in f˜
behave like one-dimensional place cells (Figure 2c). When the inverse is understandable as
a function over some variable other than time, we will write f˜(
∗
x).
Optimal Weber-Fechner distribution of s. Thus far we’ve discussed at a formal level
how to use many neurons with different values of s to represent the Laplace transform of
functions and how to use the operator L-1k to construct an approximation of the original
5to see this, set α(t) = dx
dt
and multiply both sides of Eq. 9 by dt
dx
.
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function f˜(
∗
x) with many neurons corresponding to many values of
∗
x. It remains to deter-
mine how to allocate neurons to values of s and
∗
x. Because
∗
x is in one-to-one relationship
with s, it is sufficient to specify the allocation of neurons to s.
It has been argued that it is optimal to allocate neurons to represent a continuous
variable in such a way that receptive fields are evenly spaced as a function of the logarithm
of that variable (Howard & Shankar, 2018). In addition to enabling a natural explanation of
the Weber-Fechner law, positioning receptors evenly along a logarithmic scale also enables
the neural system to extract the same amount of information from functions with a wide
range of intrinsic scales. This logarithmic scaling requires that receptive field center of the
nth receptor goes up like
∗
xn = c
n.6 This compression results in a characteristic “hook” in
the heatmaps constructed by sorting neurons on their peak time (as in Fig. 2b). Coupled
with a linear increase in receptive field width with an increase in x,7 this arrangement means
that the acuity between adjacent receptors is a constant.
The Laplace transform of the Diffusion Model
We propose a model of evidence accumulation in which the Laplace transform of
accumulated evidence is represented at each moment and inverted via a linear operator. The
result is evidence on a supported dimension with logarithmic compression. The diffusion
model describes the position of a particle relative to two decision boundaries. Inspired
by the curvature present in the Morcos and Harvey (2016) data, we maintain the Laplace
transform of the distance to each of the two boundaries, treating the appropriate decision
bound as zero for each of the two functions (Figure 3). This formalism provides a mapping
between the diffusion model at an algorithmic level and neurons at an implementational
level.
Let us refer to the two alternative responses as l and r and the net evidence for the
left alternative accumulated up to time t as L(t) − R(t). The decision-maker’s goal is to
estimate the net evidence that has been experienced since the trial began. The instantaneous
evidence gives the time derivative of that variable. In the random dot motion paradigm we
would expect the instantaneous derivative to fluctuate more or less continuously; the mean
of this derivative would differ across conditions with different levels of motion coherence. In
paradigms with discrete clicks or flashes of light, the presence of a click signals a non-zero
value of the derivative, with the side of the click controlling the sign of the derivative.
We start constructing this model by assuming that we have two sets of leaky accu-
mulators FL(s) and FR(s). These correspond to opponent pairs of evidence accumulators.
FL(s) codes for the Laplace transform of L− R over the range 0 to a and FR(s) codes for
the Laplace transform of R − L over the domain a to 0. We adopt the strategy of assign-
ing each α(t) to the derivative of this decision variable; αL(t) = −αR(t). When evidence
6This implies the ordinal variable n ∝ log ∗x.
7An increase in receptive field width would appear as increase in the width of the central ridge in Fig. 2b.
This spread is not visible due to the properties of the recording method used in that study; an increase in
receptive field width with peak time is observed in time cell studies using other recording techniques (Jin,
Fujii, & Graybiel, 2009; Salz et al., 2016; Mello et al., 2015; Tiganj et al., 2018).
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Figure 3. Implementing the diffusion model with many neurons via the Laplace transform. At an
algorithmic level, the diffusion model describes an abstract particle representing the quantity of net
accumulated evidence moving towards two boundaries. At the implementational level, the position
of this particle is represented in the Laplace domain by two sets of units that code for the Laplace
transform of position relative to the two boundaries, F (s). These units have exponentially-decaying
“receptive fields” with respect to net evidence. Each unit is parameterized by a value s that controls
its rate of decay—different colors correspond to different values of s. Another set of units f˜(
∗
x)
approximates the inverse Laplace transform. Units in this representation have receptive fields that
tile the evidence axis. Each unit is parameterized by a value
∗
x that controls the center of its receptive
field. These units are compressed and scale-invariant in the same way that time cells generated by
the same equations are (Figure 2).
accumulation begins, we want to have
FL(s, 0) = e
−sz
FR(s, 0) = e
−s(a−z) (10)
where z corresponds to the bias term and a corresponds to the boundary separation. Note
that these correspond to the same location on the decision axis, but reference to different
starting points. This initialization can be accomplished by “pulsing” each accumulator
with a large α value. The sum of the area under these two pulses controls the boundary
separation. The difference controls the bias.
After initialization, as evidence is accumulated, we set αL(t) =
d(L−R)
dt and αR(t) =
d(R−L)
dt and evolve both FL(s) and FR(s) according to Eq. 9. In this way each set of
integrators codes for the Laplace transform of the distance to each of the two decision
boundaries.
At each moment a second set of units holds the approximate inversion of the Laplace
transform, f˜L(
∗
x) and f˜R(
∗
x) using
f˜L(
∗
x) = L-1k FL(s)
f˜R(
∗
x) = L-1k FR(s) (11)
By analogy to time cells and place cells, these units tile the decision space with compressed
receptive fields that grow sharper in precision as each unit’s preferred decision outcome is
approached.
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Compression of
∗
x gives equal discriminability in probability space
Noting the characteristic curvature in the Morcos and Harvey (2016) data (Fig. 1),
we configure each set of integrators to represent distance to the appropriate decision bound.
Following previous work on time and space (Howard & Shankar, 2018), we choose a Weber-
Fechner scaling of the
∗
x axis. Denoting the value of
∗
x for each unit like,
∗
x1,
∗
x2 . . .
∗
xn gives∗
xi ∝ Cn, where C is some constant that depends on the number of units and their relative
precision (Howard & Shankar, 2018). Because of the properties of the inverse Laplace
transform, the width of each receptive field goes up proportional to the unit’s value of
∗
x.
From this expression, we can see that units are evenly spaced on a logarithmic scale.
These properties imply that the set of units has greater discriminability for smaller
values of
∗
x; as
∗
x increases the spacing between adjacent units increases. In the context of
sequential ratio testing, the distance to the bound in the diffusion model can be understood
as the distance to the bound for the log likelihood ratio. The logarithmic spacing of
∗
x means
that discriminability is equivalent in units of likelihood ratio. This is a unique prediction of
this approach that may have important theoretical and empirical implications.
Implementing response bias and imposing a response deadline
This neural circuit is externally controllable via α(t). Note that α(t) affects each
unit in a way that is appropriate to its value of s. It can be shown that affecting α(t)
for a single cell is equivalent to changing the slope of the f-i curve relating firing rate to
the magnitude of an internal current (Liu et al., in press). Changing α(t) for all the units
in F (s) simply means to change the slope of all of their f-i curves appropriately. There
are many biologically plausible mechanisms to rapidly change the slope of the f-i curve of
individual neurons (e.g., Chance, Abbott, & Reyes, 2002; Silver, 2010). Because we can
understand the implications of manipulating α(t) in terms of the entire function F (s), this
lets us readily determine conditions to implement response bias and change the boundary
separation to comply with a response deadline or even a continuously-changing estimate of
the cost of further deliberation (Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum, 2015).
In order to initialize a response bias as in Eq. 10, starting from zero activation for
all the units in both sets of F (s), a pulse in α will push each set of units away from their
respective bound. The sum of the pulses across the two accumulators is interpretable as the
boundary separation. Response bias can be simply implemented by providing a different
magnitude pulse to the two sets of accumulators. If each set of units is given the same
magnitude of a pulse in α, there is no response bias. The accumulator that receives the
smaller pulse starts evidence accumulation closer to the bound.
Similar mechanisms can be used to change the effective distance to the response
boundary rapidly. In the simulations below, we assume that the appropriate response is
executed when the activation of the first entry in f˜ , f˜(
∗
x1) reaches a threshold. If f˜L(
∗
x1)
is activated before f˜R(
∗
x1), option l is selected. In the same way that αL/R(t) can be
used to initialize evidence accumulation by pushing FL/R(s) away from the bound, so too
can αL/R(t) be used to evolve the two accumulators towards their respective bounds. By
setting both αL(t) and αR(t) to positive values, each set of accumulators evolves towards
their respective bounds. The alternative that is closer to the decision bound when this
process begins will reach its bound sooner, executing the corresponding response.
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a b
Figure 4. The Laplace transform and the inverse transform capture key findings from
the neurobiology of evidence accumulation. a. The Laplace transform is shown for one value
of s in a simulated random dot motion experiment. In this simulation, αL(t) was set at each moment
to a normally-distributed random variable with a mean that differed across condition. In the solid
curves, the mean was greater than zero; in the dashed curves the mean was less than zero for αL(t)
(and thus greater than zero for αR(t)). On the left we see that the firing rate grew with time after
information began to accumulate; the rate and direction of accumulation depended on the mean
of the random variable. When aligned to the time of response (right), firing rate showed a tight
coupling. If we changed the value of s, we would have observed the same qualitative behavior, but
with different rates of accumulation and more or less curvature on average. Compare to Fig. 1a. b.
Heatmaps for neurons participating in the inverse Laplace transform. Each line is the firing rate of
a neuron. Neurons participating in f˜L are shown on the top; neurons participating in f˜R are shown
on the bottom. On the left the firing rate is shown as a function of evidence (confounded with time)
when there is consistent evidence for the left option. On the right, the activation is shown when
there is consistent evidence for the right option. Compare to Fig. 1b.
Neural simulations
In order to demonstrate that this approach leads to neural predictions that are in
line with known neurophysiological data, we provide simulations of two paradigms that
have received a great deal of attention in the neurophysiological literature. We first show
that during the random dot motion paradigm, units in F (s) show activity that resemble
classic integrator neurons such as those observed in monkey LIP. We then show that during
performance of a discrete evidence accumulation paradigm, units in f˜(
∗
x) show receptive
fields along the decision axis not unlike those in mouse PPC.
Constant input in the random-dot motion paradigm. We simulated the random dot
motion paradigm by letting α(t) vary from moment to moment by drawing from a normal
distribution at each time step and setting αL(t) = −αR(t). As in most applications of
the diffusion model, different levels of coherence were simulated by drawing from normal
distributions with different mean values, for each of the levels of coherence.8 Figure 4a
shows the result of a representative unit with s = 2.5 in F (s).
Figure 4a summarizes the results of these simulations. Neurons in F (s) grow towards
8More precisely, we implemented Xt+∆ = Xt + A∆ + c
√
∆N (0, 1). The value of ∆ was set to .001, A
was 1.25, .83, and .625 across conditions. X(0) = 0 and we terminated the decision when X = 1.
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a bound in a noisy way. When motion coherence is away from the neuron’s preferred
direction, the firing rate instead decreases towards zero. The rate of increase is greater
when there is more motion coherence (left), resulting in faster responses for higher motion
coherence. When aligned to the time of response, the unit’s firing appears tightly aligned.
Although the response is actually triggered by the activation of a particular unit in f˜ , the
activation in f˜ is in one-to-one relationship with F (s) (see eq. 11) and all of the units in
F (s) corresponding to the selected response monotonically increase as the decision bound
becomes more near.
Note that there is a slight curvature apparent in the model neuron shown in Figure 4a.
This curvature is a consequence of the exponential function in the Laplace transform. Choos-
ing different values of the s would have resulted in more or less curvature. Note the model
predicts that neurons encoding the inverse transform would show supported receptive fields
as a function of distance from the decision point.
Information accumulators and position along a decision axis. Figure 4b shows analytic
results from deterministic evidence accumulation. Analogous to the trials in the Morcos
and Harvey (2016) paper in which evidence was only presented in favor of one option or the
other, after initialization on left trials we set αL(t) to a fixed positive constant X for the
duration of the trial; αR(t) was set to −X. On right trials the situation was reversed. We
show the activation of units in f˜L(
∗
x) and f˜R(
∗
x) on each type of trial. The model captures
the prominent features of the data. Units have receptive fields along a subset of the decision
axis. There are more units with receptive fields near the time when the decision is reached.
The width of receptive fields near the bound is less than the width of receptive fields further
from the bound. Note that this is an analytic solution. Had we simulated detailed trials
with sequences that included different amounts of net evidence, the units would still have
receptive fields along the net evidence axis.
Note that neurons encoding the transform would grow or decay exponentially in this
task as a function of distance to the bound. These neurons would have the same relationship
to the neurons in Figure 4b as border cells (Solstad, Boccara, Kropff, Moser, & Moser, 2008;
Campbell et al., 2018) do to one-dimensional place cells (Howard et al., 2014). That is,
in spatial navigation tasks, border cells fire as if they encode an exponential function of
distance to an environmental border. If border cells manifest a spectrum of decay rates,
then they encode the Laplace transform of distance to that border. Taking the inverse
transform would result in cells with receptive fields that are activated in a circumscribed
region of space (Lever, Burton, Jeewajee, O’Keefe, & Burgess, 2009).
The results in Figure 4b are closely analogous to predictions for time cells and place
cells from the same formalism (Howard et al., 2014; Tiganj et al., 2018). Different sources of
evidence trigger different sequences leading to different decisions; this is closely analogous to
experimental results from time and place. For instance, a recent study showed that distinct
stimuli in a working memory task trigger distinct sequences of time cells in monkey lPFC
(Tiganj et al., 2018). Similarly, distinct sequences of place cells fire as an animal moves
from a starting point along distinct trajectories (McNaughton, Barnes, & O’Keefe, 1983).
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1. Exponential functions for evidence accumulation.
2. Spectrum of rate constants s.
3. Laplace/Inverse pairs across tasks.
4. Linked non-uniform spectra of rate constants s and
∗
x.
Table 1: Summary of novel neural predictions. See text for details.
Novel neural predictions
The present approach is conceptually very different from previous neural implemen-
tations of evidence accumulation models. In most prior models, the assumption is that
many neurons provide noisy exemplars of the decision variable; an estimate of the decision
variable can be extracted by averaging over many neurons (e.g., Zandbelt et al., 2014). In
contrast, although the activity of units in F (s) are correlated with the amount of instan-
taneous evidence, they are not noisy exemplars of that scalar value. Rather the Laplace
transform is written across many units with different values of s. At any moment, the
activity of different units in F (s) are a known function of the decision variable, leading to
quantitative relationships both as a function of time for a particular unit but also relation-
ships between units. Moreover, the model predicts specific relationships between units in
F (s) and f˜(
∗
x), which should appear in pairs in decision-making tasks. These properties
lead to several distinct neural predictions. These predictions are summarized in Table 1
and detailed below.
Prediction 1: Exponential functions. The hypothesis that the brain maintains an
estimate of the Laplace transform of the decision variable, rather than a linear function of
the decision variable leads to distinct predictions. Even in circumstances where evidence is
accumulating at a constant rate, the activity of integrator neurons should not in general be
linear. Note that for values of x small relative to 1/s it is difficult to distinguish e−sx from
1 − x. Moreover, the firing rate as a function of time should be a function of the actual
evidence as well as changing decision bounds. However, systematic deviation from linearity
is a clear prediction of the present approach.
Note that a recent literature has questioned whether information accumulates con-
tinuously in information accumulation neurons or whether it changes abruptly in discrete
steps (e.g., Latimer, Yates, Meister, Huk, & Pillow, 2015). One could imagine that the ex-
ponential function is expressed as a statistical average over a number of units each of which
obey step-like evolution following the same constant hazard function. It is also possible
that work arguing for discrete steps in activation has not considered the appropriate family
of continuously-evolving activation. Indeed, recent work has begun to explore non-linear
models for activation as a function of time (Zoltowski, Latimer, Yates, Huk, & Pillow, 2018)
and has found relatively nuanced results.
Prediction 2: Spectrum of s values. The most fundamential prediction of the approach
proposed here is that different units coding for the decision variable integrate information
with different rate constants s. We can think of each neuron’s value of 1/s as its “evidence
constant.” The fundamental prediction of this approach is that s (and 1/s) do not take on
the same value across neurons. Although it has not to our knowledge been systematically
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studied, there is evidence suggesting that neurons respond heterogeneously during simple
decision-making tasks. For instance, Figure 7 in Peixoto et al. (2018) appears to show that
different units discriminate the identity of a future response at different points during a
decision. The computational approach proposed here requires heterogeneity in s values; a
spectrum of s values is essential to construct an estimate of x via the Laplace domain.
In most RDM experiments, the decision variable fluctuates in an unpredictable way
from moment-to-moment. Moreover, changing decision bounds would also change the fir-
ing rate for many neurons simultaneusly. However, the hypothesis that different units
obey the same equations, but with different values of s suggests a strategy for estimating
the spectrum. Although α(t) may fluctuate from moment to moment based on the in-
stantaneous evidence and perhaps also with changing decision bounds, the same value of
α(t) is distributed to all of the neurons estimating F (s) coding the distance to a partic-
ular bound. Thus the momentary variability is shared across units. Suppose we had two
simultaneously-recorded LIP neurons with the same receptive field and rate constants s1
and s2. On individual trials, each unit would appear to fluctuate randomly over the trial
as the net evidence fluctuates. One unit would move like a bead on a wire along the curve
es1x(t); the other would move like a bead on a wire along the curve es2x(t). Although the
fluctuations along each curve may appear random, plotting the firing rate of one neuron as
a function of the other would result in an smooth exponential curve. In practice one would
need to consider an appropriate time bin over which to average spikes and undoubtedly face
other technical issues in performing this analyses.
Prediction 3: Laplace/Inverse pairs across tasks. In this paper we have noted that in-
tegrator neurons observed in RDM tasks have properties analogous to the Laplace transform
of distance to the bound, F (s), and that sequentially-activated cells in a virtual navigation
decision task have properties analogous to the inverse Laplace transform estimating distance
to the bound, f˜(
∗
x). The hypothesis presented here requires that the inverse transform f˜(
∗
x)
is constructed from the transform F (s). Moreover, the trigger for the actual response in
the RDM task is the activation of units with the smallest value of
∗
x. This approach thus
requires that both forms of representation should be present in the brain in both tasks.
In tasks where instantaneous evidence is under experimental control and becomes
available at discrete times (such as the (Morcos & Harvey, 2016) task), the Laplace trans-
form F (s) should remain fixed during periods of time when no evidence is available. When
evidence is provided, neurons coding for the transform should gradually step up (or step
down) their firing as the decision bound they code for becomes closer (or further away).
Note also that one can implement a leaky accumulator by including a non-zero value to
α(t) during periods of time when no evidence is presented. Conversely, in tasks where the
instantaneous evidence is not well controlled, such as the RDM task, neurons coding for
f˜(
∗
x) should still have “receptive fields” along the decision axis, although in practice it may
be much more difficult to observe these receptive fields.
Geometrically, F (s) and f˜(
∗
x) have different properties that might be possible to dis-
tinguish experimentally even in an RDM task where it is difficult to measure single-cell
receptive fields. Consider a hypothetical covariance matrix observed over many neurons
representing either F (s) or f˜(
∗
x) during an RDM task in which the animal chooses among
two alternative responses l and r. For units representing F (s), at the time of the response
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the population consists of two populations. That is, at the time of an l response, neu-
rons participating in FL(s) are maximally activated and neurons participating in FR(s) are
deactivated. This distinction will be reflected in the covariance matrix; one would expect
the first principal component of the covariance matrix to correspond to this source of vari-
ance. Now, for F (s), because neurons change their firing monotonically along the decision
axis, this principal component will also load on other parts of the decision axis, changing
smoothly.9 In contrast, consider the set of neurons active at the time of the response for a
population representing f˜(
∗
x). Like F (s), that the population of neurons in f˜(
∗
x) active at
the time of an l response is different than the population active at the time of an r response.
However, unlike F (s), because neurons in f˜(
∗
x) have circumscribed receptive fields along the
decision axis, the neurons active at the time of the response for l are not the same as the
neurons active, say, three quarters of the way along the decision axis towards an l response.
It may be possible to distinguish these geometrical properties by examining the spectrum
of the covariance matrices.
We will avoid commiting to predictions about what brain regions (or populations)
are responsible for coding F (s) and which are responsible for coding f˜(
∗
x) in any particular
task. It is clear that many brain regions participate in even simple decisions (e.g., Peixoto
et al., 2018). Moreover, the task in Morcos and Harvey (2016) is relatively complicated and
may rely on very different cognitive mechanisms than the RDM task. The prediction is that
there should be some regions that encode the transform and the inverse in any particular
evidence accumulation task; it is possible that these regions vary across tasks.
Prediction 4: Linked non-uniform spectra of rate constants s and
∗
x. Experience with
time cells and computational considerations (Shankar & Howard, 2013; Howard & Shankar,
2018) leads to the prediction that the spectra of s and
∗
x values should be non-uniform.
Although it may be challenging to evaluate experimentally, Weber-Fechner scaling also
leads to a quantitatively precise prediction about the form of the distribution.
It is now clear that time cells are not uniformly distributed. As a sequence of time
cells unfolds, there are more neurons that fire early in the sequence and fewer that fire
later in the sequence. This phenomenon can be seen clearly from the curvature of the
central ridge in Figure 2b and has been evaluated statistically in a number of studies in
many brain regions (e.g., Kraus, Robinson, White, Eichenbaum, & Hasselmo, 2013; Salz et
al., 2016; Mello et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2009; Tiganj et al., 2018). If similar rules govern
the distribution of neurons coding for distance to a decision bound we would expect to
find more neurons with receptive fields near the bound, with small values of
∗
x, and fewer
neurons with receptive fields further from the bound with larger values of
∗
x. Weber-Fechner
scaling predicts further that the number of cells with a value of
∗
x <
∗
xo should go up with
log
∗
xo, meaning that the probability of finding a neuron with a value of
∗
xo should go down
like 1/
∗
xo.
The computational approach proposed in this paper links F (s) and f˜(
∗
x). This natu-
rally leads to the prediction that the distribution of values for
∗
x and s are linked. Recalling
that
∗
x ≡ k/s enables us to extend the predictions about the distribution of ∗x values in
9Because the growth/decay of the units is not at the same rate for each neuron, we would expect additional
principal components to capture this residual.
EVIDENCE ACCUMULATION IN THE LAPLACE DOMAIN 18
populations representing f˜(
∗
x) to the distribution of s values in populations representing
F (s). There should be a larger number of neurons with large values of s and fewer neurons
with small values of s. Weber-Fechner scaling predicts that the number of neurons in F (s)
with values of s > so should change linearly with log so. Similarly, the probability of finding
a neuron with a value of so should go down like 1/so.
Discussion
The present paper describes a neural implementation of the diffusion model (Ratcliff,
1978). Rather than individual neurons each providing a noisy estimate of the decision
variable, many neurons participate in a distributed code representing distance to the decision
bound. Neurons coding for the Laplace transform of this distance have properties that
resemble those of “integrator neurons” in regions such as LIP. Neurons estimating the
distance itself, constructed from approximating the inverse transform, have receptive fields
along the decision axis.
Alternative algorithmic evidence accumulation models in the Laplace domain
In this paper we have focused on implementation of the diffusion model. However,
it is straightforward to formulate other algorithmic models in the Laplace domain. For
instance, in order to implement a race model, all that needs to be done is to make αL and
αR independent of one another rather than anticorrelated as in the present implementation
of the diffusion model. Similarly, one can implement a leak term (Busemeyer & Townsend,
1993; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006) by including a constant negative term
to each of the α(t) values. The magnitude of the constant term is proportional to the leak
parameter.
Insofar as these approaches are equivalent to the corresponding algorithmic model,
adopting this form for neural implementation entails at most subtle behavioral distinctions
to classic implementations of the diffusion model. However, there is one unique property
that follows from this approach of formulating decision-making as movement along a Weber-
Fechner compressed decision axis. As discussed above, the logarithmic compression along
the
∗
x axis means that the neural representation is not equidiscriminable in the decision
variable X, but in eX . If X is understandable as the log likelihood ratio (Eq. 3), then this
means that the magnitude of the change in the likelihood ratio itself controls the change
in the neural representation. This would predict that the just-noticeable-differences in the
decision variable are controlled by the likelihood ratio itself rather than the log-likelihood
ratio. In practice this prediciton would be difficult to assess in any particular experiment
because in sequential decision-making tasks the likelihood ratio as a function of time is not
a physical observable but is inferred based on assumptions about the processing capabilities
of the observer.
Unification of working memory, timing and evidence accumulation in the Laplace domain
As mentioned in the introduction, many of the most influential ideas in computational
neuroscience are derived from cognitive models developed without consideration of neural
data. Often in cognitive psychology these models are treated as independent of one another.
One of the contributions of the present paper is that it enables the formulation of cognitive
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models of evidence accumulation in the same Laplace-transform formalism as cognitive
models of other tasks, including a range of memory and timing studies (Shankar & Howard,
2012; Howard et al., 2015; Singh, Tiganj, & Howard, in press). This paper also enables
consideration of neural models of evidence accumulation in the same formalism as neural
models of representations of time and space (Howard et al., 2014; Tiganj et al., 2018).
Although in cognitive psychology, models of working memory and evidence accumu-
lation have been treated as largely separate topics (but see Usher & McClelland, 2001;
Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005), in computational neu-
roscience they have been treated in much closer proximity. Indeed, the state of a perfect in-
tegrator reflects its previous inputs (Eq. 1). In computational neuroscience, decision-making
models use similar recurrent dynamics (Wong, Huk, Shadlen, & Wang, 2007; Wang, 2002)
that are used for working memory maintenance (e.g., Chaudhuri & Fiete, 2016; Machens,
Romo, & Brody, 2005; Romo, Brody, Herna´ndez, & Lemus, 1999). At the neural level, a
perfect integrator predicts stable states in the absence of external activation (Funahashi,
Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989), analogous to the binary presence of an item in a fixed-
capacity working memory buffer.
In cognitive psychology models of evidence accumulation and timing have been more
closely linked. Noting that in the case of a constant drift rate, Xt is proportional to the time
since evidence accumulation began, models have used integrators to model timing (Rivest
& Bengio, 2011; Simen, Balci, de Souza, Cohen, & Holmes, 2011; Simen, Rivest, Ludvig,
Balci, & Killeen, 2013; Luzardo, Rivest, Alonso, & Ludvig, 2017; Balcı & Simen, 2016).
“Diffusion models for timing” are also closely related to models of learning (Gallistel &
Gibbon, 2000; Killeen & Fetterman, 1988; Luzardo, Alonso, & Mondrago´n, 2017) and the
scalar expectancy theory of timing (Gibbon & Church, 1984; Gibbon, Church, & Meck,
1984). At the neural level, these models predict that during timing tasks, firing rate should
grow monotonically, a phenomenon that has been reported (e.g., Kim, Ghim, Lee, & Jung,
2013; Xu, Zhang, Dan, & Poo, 2014).
In both of these cases, the neural implementations of the cognitive models has found
some neurophysiological support. In each of the foregoing cases, neural models implement
a scalar value from an algorithmic cognitive model as an average over many representative
neurons. In the case of timing models as in evidence accumulation models, this predicts
monotonically increasing or decreasing firing rates. As we have seen here, monotonically
increasing or decreasing functions can be generated by neurons participating in the Laplace
transform of a function representing a scalar value over a set of neurons. However, the
present framework also predicts that populations with monotonically changing firing rates
should be coupled to populations with sequentially activated neurons like those found in
f˜(
∗
x) and that these two forms of representation are closely connected to one another. Thus,
findings that working memory maintenance is accompanied by sequentially-activated cells
during the delay period of a working memory task (Tiganj et al., 2018) or that timing tasks
give rise to sequentially activated neurons (Tiganj, Kim, Jung, & Howard, 2017) can be
readily reconciled with the present approach but are difficult to reconcile with models that
require representation of a scalar value as an average over many representative neurons.
The present approach and much previous work in computational neuroscience differ in their
account of how information is distributed over neurons.
Function representation via the Laplace domain also has potentially great explanatory
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power in developing neural models of relatively complex computations. It has been long
appreciated that computations can be efficiently performed in the Laplace domain. In much
the same way that understanding of the mathematics lets us readily specify how to set α
to accomplish various goals such as initializing with a specific response bias in the evidence
accumulation framework described here, access to the Laplace domain lets us readily write
down mechanisms for translation of functions (Shankar, Singh, & Howard, 2016) or perform
arithmetic operations on different functions (Howard et al., 2015). Computations in the
Laplace domain require a large-scale organization for macroscopic numbers of neurons;
this large-scale organization enables basic computations. Insofar as many different forms
of information in the brain use the same form of compact compressed coding, one can in
principle recycle the same computational mechanisms for very different forms of information,
including sensory representations, representations of time and space, or numerosity.
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